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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3068
___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DESHAWN WIGGINS,
Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00357)
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Martini
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 9, 2008

BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

Filed: September 23, 2008
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Wiggins was convicted of one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922)(g)(1). After denying Wiggins’ request for a
variance, the District Court sentenced him to one hundred months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Wiggins makes two principal claims. First, he argues that the District Court
improperly questioned witnesses, thereby denying Wiggins a fair trial. Second, Wiggins
argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the District Court did not consider his
claim that he was entitled to a variance as a result of the conditions he endured during
pre-trial confinement. Neither argument has merit and we will affirm the District Court’s
sentence.
We turn first to the District Court’s questioning of witnesses. Federal Rule of
Evidence 614(b) provides that the district court may interrogate witnesses. Inasmuch as a
trial is a search for the truth and the court is more than a mere umpire of the proceedings,
it is certainly within its province to question witnesses. Riley v. Goodman, 315 F.2d 232,
234 (3d Cir.1963) (citations omitted). However, as we have recognized, a judge must not
“abandon his [or her] proper role and assume that of an advocate.” United States v.
Green, 544 F.2d 138, 147 (3d Cir.1976). A district court does have an obligation to
interrupt the presentation of counsel in order to clarify misunderstandings or otherwise
ensure the trial proceeds efficiently and fairly.
On appeal, Wiggins argues that in nine separate instances the District Court
overstepped its bounds, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. With one exception,
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Wiggins failed to object to the District Court's questioning during trial. A defendant must
object at trial in order to preserve such an argument for appeal. If the defendant fails to
object, the argument is waived except in the “limited exception” where the trial court's
questions were so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Thus, we
review the District Court’s questioning for plain error. As to the one question to which
the defendant did object, our review is for abuse of discretion. If we find that the District
Court abused its discretion, we must then determine whether the questioning was
harmless or prejudiced Wiggins’ substantial rights.
We first address those questions where Wiggins failed to object. It is clear from
the record that the judge was simply trying to help the jury and himself fully understand
confusing testimony. Further, as the Government points out, many of the trial judge’s
questions assisted in clarifying the testimony of defense witnesses. Although there were
numerous interruptions and questions by the trial court, our reading of the entire record
convinces us that the court’s interrogation was within the bounds of examination. We find
no plain error in the trial judge's actions.
Wiggins did object to the District Court’s inquiry of a Newark Police Department
technician regarding latent fingerprints. Our review on appeal is deferential. The trial
judge does not err unless her conduct was “inimical and partisan, clearly evident and
prejudicial.” Riley, 315 F.2d at 234-35.
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Testifying as a defense witness, the police department technician indicated that he
had dusted the weapon in question for fingerprints and found none. During direct
testimony, Wiggins’ lawyers asked the technician for an explanation of latent fingerprints.
The District Court then asked the witness for clarification as to what a latent fingerprint is
and how such prints are affected by environmental conditions. After the technician’s
testimony, Wiggins’ counsel stated at a side-bar conference that the District Court’s
questioning seemed “helpful to the Government and not particularly helpful to the
defense.” The District Court noted that its questions were limited and necessary because
the technician had been called by the defense as an expert witness, yet the defense failed
to properly explain latent fingerprints to the jury. The record does not support any
inference other than that the District Court interrogated the police technician on these
points to clarify his testimony.
Finally, even were we to assume that the questions at issue were improper, any
prejudice Wiggins might have suffered was cured by the District Court’s instruction that
the jury should neither infer anything from the questions of the court nor consider
whether the court had an opinion about the case. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in questioning witnesses during the course of the trial.
Wiggins next argues that the sentence he received was unreasonable. Wiggins
spent fourteen months in the Passaic County jail while awaiting trial and sentencing. He
maintains that the District Judge failed to adequately consider his argument that the
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conditions at the Passaic County jail merited a variance from the advisory guidelines
range. Further, Wiggins argues that the District Court improperly applied a departure
framework to his request for a variance. We are not persuaded by either argument.
With respect to his request for a variance because of jail conditions, the record is
clear that the District Judge considered Wiggins’ request. We find that the sentence
imposed by the District Court was reasonable. The record in this appeal indicates that the
District Court reasonably considered and applied the Section 3553(a) factors in
determining Wiggins’ sentence, including his argument for a variance. The sentence
imposed was within the range suggested by the guidelines, notably at the low end of that
scale. Further, the District Court made adequate findings on the record, reflecting its
meaningful consideration of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Having determined that the District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to the
relevant factors, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying
them to Wiggins. United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir.). The District
Court's sentence was within the Guidelines range for the offense level, and the District
Court clearly articulated its reasons for sentencing Wiggins. Accordingly, we will affirm.
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